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Evidence Issues in Employment Cases 
ALI-ABA and Georgetown CLE 
Georgetown University Law Center 
February 8, 2007 
Professor Lynn McLain, University of Baltimore 
I. The Purposes Underlying the Rules 
A. Purposes of the Rules of Evidence Altogether: Fairness, Justice, and 
Efficiency 
Rule 102 PURPOSE AND CONSTRUCTION 
These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination of 
unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of the growth and development of the law 
of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly 
determined. 
B. The Most Fundamental Rule: Only Relevant Evidence is Potentially 
Admissible 
Rule 402 RELEVANT EVIDENCE GENERALLY ADMISSIBLE; 
IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE INADMISSmLE 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other 
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence 
which is not relevant is not admissible. 
C. The "Clean-Up Batter," a Final Shot at Exclusion, Being a Summary of the 
Considerations That Have Led to Other, More Specific Rules of Exclusion of 
Relevant Evidence 
Rule 403 EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON 
GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, OR WASTE 
OF TIME 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
D. Examples of 4011403 Analysis: How Much Probative Value Does this Evidence 
Add to the Case? Does It Carry a High Risk of Unfair Prejudice? Is It 
Worth the Time It Will Take? 
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1. When Are an Employer's Agent's Remarks "Stray Remarks" that 
Ought Not Be Considered against the Employer? 
Generally, the courts consider the following when evaluating the relevancy 
of "stray remarks" to an allegedly discriminatory employment decision: 
(a) Whether the disputed remark was made by the decision-maker (not 
merely an agent of the employer uninvolved in the challenged 
decision); 
(b) Whether the disputed remark was isolated or part of a pattern of 
biased comments; 
(c) Whether the disputed remark was made close in time to the 
challenged decision; and 
(d) Whether the disputed remark was ambiguous or clearly reflective 
of discriminatory bias. 
See, e.g., Annot., 155 A.L.R. Fed. 283 (ADEA cases). 
• Tooson v. Roadway Express, Inc., 47 Fed. Appx. 370, 375 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(no error in jury instruction: "You are not to consider in your deliberations any 
remarks, comments, or characterizations of plaintiff or plaintiff's employment 
with Roadway Express, Inc. unless plaintiff has shown by a preponderance of the 
legal evidence that the remarks. comments, or characterizations were made by an 
employee of Roadway Express, Inc. who had decision-making authority and that 
the remarks, comments, or characterizations were related to defendants' decision 
to discipline or discharge the plaintiff. Unless or until you find that plaintiff has 
shown this, you are not to consider any stray remarks, comments, or 
characterizations in your deliberations. Remarks, if any, made by those who 
played a meaningful role in the decision to discipline or discharge plaintiff, 
however, are relevant."). 
• McMillan v. Massachusetts SPCA, 140 F.3d 288,300 (1st Cir. 1998) (a clear 
connection between the statement or action and the employment decision is 
needed to make it relevant even if made by the decision maker, but no abuse of 
discretion in admitting remarks here; no error, let alone plain error, in following 
jury instruction: "Take, as an example, an issue in this case that might be 
relevant to the issue of intent: You heard that Dr. Thornton made one or more 
remarks that might have been construed as derogatory to women. If you believe 
that he did so, you might conclude that such remarks reflected a personal attitude 
on his part about the value of women generally or you might conclude that the 
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remark was random and completely out of character. If you believe the former, 
you might decide that a given remark is evidence of a discriminatory mindset and 
infer from it that Dr. Thornton's decisions regarding Dr. McMillan's salary were 
influenced by discriminatory intent. If you believe the latter, the remark would 
have no value as evidence of Dr. Thornton's motivations and you would disregard 
it in reaching a verdict."}. 
• Browning v. President Riverboat Casino-Missouri, Inc., 139 F.3d 631, 633-
34 (8th Cir. 1997) (supervisor and principal decision-maker's statements "that 
white boy better learn who he's messing with, he better get his act together" were 
more than mere stray remarks, and "directly suggests the existence of bias; no 
inference is necessary"). 
• Saffa v. Oklahoma Oncology, Inc., 405 F.Supp.2d 1280, 1288-90 (N.D. Okla. 
2005) (denying defendant's motion to exclude alleged harasser's comments 
referring to sexual matters; although harasser may also have made such sexual 
comments in the presence of men, the court cannot find either that they were "not ' 
gender based or free from sexual animus"). 
2. Should the Court accept Proffered Stipulations Not Agreed to By 
Proponent of Evidence Stipulated to? 
• Old Chiefv. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (Souter) (5 to 4) (in 
prosecution for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, abuse of discretion to 
reject defense stipulation to the fact of the prior conviction and instead admit the 
full record of a prior judgment, when the name or nature of the prior offense [here 
assault causing serious bodily injury] raises the risk of a verdict tainted by 
improper considerations). In assessing the probative value of a particular piece of 
evidence. "evidentiary alternatives" may be compared, 117 S.Ct. at 682, but "with 
an appreciation of the offering party's need for evidentiary richness and narrative 
integrity in presenting a case ... ," Id. at 651. 
• In Briggs v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 174 F.R.D. 369 (D.Md. 1997), a 
thoughtful decision by Judge Grimm, similar factors are set out regarding whether 
the court should accept a proffered stipulation by the defendant in a civil case. 
II. Specific Rules Regarding Character Evidence and Evidence of Other Acts 
A. Character Evidence in General 
As the following chart illustrates, character evidence may be offered either as 
substantive evidence (Rules 404-406 and 412-415) or only as to credibility 
(impeachment or rehabilitation, Rules 608- 609, and 806), 
-3-




General rule of exclusion (the 
"propensity rule") 404(a) & (b) 
Exceptions to propensity rule 
a. 
b. 
406 individual's habitlroutine of 
a business 
404(a)(1) & (2) criminal cases 
only, when accused opens door 
c. 412 sexual offense! harassment 
victims' prior sex with 
defendant 
d. 413-415 sexual assault 
defendants' other acts of sexual 
assaultlchild molestation (415 
applies in civil cases) 
3. Purposes other than proving propensity 
a. 405(b) character an essential 
element ... (party must prove 
not merely an act, but character 
of a person ... ) 
b. 404(b) limited permissible 




Character as to truthfulness & veracity 
1. 608(b) "prior bad acts" 
2. 608(a) character witnesses re: t & v 
3. 609 prior convictions 
4. 
5. 
404(a)(3) merely makes such use 
legitimate 
806 hearsay declarants 
B. Rules 404 and 406 
Rule 404 	 CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO 
PROVE CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES 
(a) Character Evidence Generally 
(a) Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not 
admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion, except: 
[(1) and (2) exceptions in criminal cases only] 
(3) Character o/witness. 
Evidence of the character of a witness [with regard to character for 
truthfulness, and thus credibility], as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.1 
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove 
the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. 
It may, however, he admissible for other purposes, such as proof ofmotive,l 
opportunity, intent,' preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, 
identity,4 or absence of mistake or accidentS [notice requirement in criminal 
cases] . 
I This cross-reference is to Rule 608(a), which permits reputation or opinion character witnesses' testimony 
as to character for truthfulness of either a testifying witness or, Rule 806, a hearsay declarant; Rule 608(b), which 
permits questioning of the witness herself about her prior acts (that did not result in convictions) that are probative of 
her untruthfulness; and Rule 609, which permits questioning of a witness about certain of her prior convictions. 
2 E.g., Johnson v. Hugo's Skateway, 974 F.2d 1408, 1413 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (no abuse of discretion 
to admit evidence of a 1979 consent order on limited question whether defendant had posted signs or instructed its 
employers as to nondiscriminatory practices, as required by the order; evidence was relevant to defendant's motive 
and intent in actions taken against plaintiffs). 
3 E.g., Mullen v. Princess Anne Volunteer Fire Co., 853 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1988) (harmless error to 
exclude evidence of racial slurs, which were relevant to show racial animus); Wyatt v. Security Inn Food & 
Beverage, Inc., 819 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1987) (race discrimination). 
4 E.g., Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 945 (4th Cir. 1988) (in civil suit for injuries caused by alleged 
sexual abuse of child of third marriage, reversible error to exclude evidence of sexual abuse of defendant's child by 
second marriage, which tended to identify defendants as abusers since only they had access to both girls). 
5 E.g., Westfield Ins. Co. v. Harris, 134 F.3d 608, 613-15 (4th Cif. 1998) (abuse of discretion and 
reversible error in excluding evidence of seven other fires as to which insured had made claims, which were 
probative of whether the fire in instant case was accidental; trial court misapplied Fed. R. Evid. 403 in excluding 
evidence on basis of "unfair prejudice"); Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 94,945 (4th Cir. 1988) (in civil suit for 
injuries caused by alleged sexual abuse of child of third marriage, reversible error to exclude evidence of sexual 
abuse of defendant's child by second marriage, which negated several defenses, including that child plaintiff's 
injuries were self-inflicted). 
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1. Both the First Clause of 404(a) and the First Sentence of 404(b) Codify 
the "Propensity Rule" of Exclusion 
The "propensity rule" generally excludes evidence of a person's 
other acts or a person's character or character trait offered as substantive 
evidence to show that the person acted "in character" on the occasion at 
issue in the case. It applies to all character evidence, whether of 
reputation, opinion, or prior specific conduct. 
When proof of character is offered merely to show that a party 
is a "good" or "bad person, either in general or with regard to a 
particular trait, and thus as circumstantial evidence that the person 
acted "in character" and did the "right" or "wrong" thing in the 
incident at issue at trial, it is inadmissible. 
QJ..,. Hypo #1: P v. D-Employer for sexual harassment (including unwanted touching) of P by 
S-Supervisor. P offers evidence that S had a reputation for being a bullying "womanizer" 
and that other victims had (months before the incident involving P) reported S's 
unwanted sexual touching of them to D. "Objection, propensity rule!" In response, P's 
counsel states that the evidence is offered to prove that S also harassed P. Ruling under 
Rule 404? [Note that Rule 415 might lead to a different ruling, if the incidents qualified 
as sexual assaults. See pp. 11-13.] 
2. The Reasons for the "Propensity Rule" of Exclusion 
a. Not a lack of all probative value, but rather a fear that the jury 
will overvalue the character evidence ... 
The United States Supreme Court has noted: 
The inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the 
contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so 
overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and 
deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge. The 
overriding policy of excluding such evidence, despite its admitted 
probative value, is the practical experience that its disallowance tends 
to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice. 
Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-79 (1948). 
b. '" and a recognition that mini-trials, within the trial on the current 
claim, as to how a person conducted herself at other times in 
the past, will devour court time. They will also confuse and 
distract the fact-finder from the issues at hand. 
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3. Waiver of Protection of the Propensity Rule: "Sweeping Claims" 
a. 	 When a party or witness makes a sweeping claim of innocence, 
such as by testifying on direct, "I've never touched a woman other 
than my wife," this claim may open the door to other acts evidence 
that would not otherwise have been admissible. E.g., Walder v. 
United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954); United States v. Johnson, 634 
F.2d 735, 737-38 (4th Cir. 1980). 
b. 	 Of course, the opposing party's counsel ought not be permitted to 
open the door by cornering the witness into making such a claim. 
c. 	 But that witness's counsel's making such sweeping claim in 
opening statement will open the door. 
4. 	 Why Rule 404(b)'s Second Sentence, the Inapplicability of the Propensity 
Rule Regarding Evidence of "Other Acts" that Have Special Relevance ' 
to a Contested Narrower Issue in the Case? 
a. 	 Increased probative value: more narrowly tailored, and to a 
genuine, not merely formal, issue in the case. 
b. 	 Consequently, less "unfair" prejudice. 
c. 	 The increase in probative value may make the consumption of 
time, necessary to hear the evidence, well spent. 
Cj. Rule 406: evidence rising to the level of an individual's habit 
or a business's or other organization's routine practice is 
admissible to prove action in conformity therewith.6 Again, the 
evidence has increased probative value as it regards a routine 
response to a repeated, specific situation. E.g., smoking cigarettes 
to the filter; putting one's belt on from left to right; routinely 
optically scanning certain records and destroying paper copies .... 
6 Rule 406 reads: 
Rule 406. Habit; Routine Practice 
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether 
corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the 




C. Admissibility under Rule 404(b) of Evidence of Other Acts for a Non-
Propensity Purpose 
Rule 404(b) is captioned, "Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts." One need not 
fit the evidence under 404(b) if the evidence is not of "other" acts. 
For example, circumstantial evidence that is relevant to placing a 
criminal accused at the scene of the crime, or as having an instrumentality or 
fruit of the crime, is admissible (subject to Rule 403) to prove the defendant's 
commission of the charged crime, even though it coincidentally proves the 
defendant's commission of another crime. It is, under these circumstances, not 
considered to be evidence of acts "other" than the one charged. See, e.g., 
United States v. Grimmond, 137 F.3d 831-33 (4th Cir. 1998) (evidence that 
defendant shot two people was properly admitted to prove he had a firearm). 
Qb In the same case as in Hypo #1, (p. 6), P offers evidence that her sweat pants and sports 
bra were stolen from her locker in the company gym and found in S's apartment. 
"Objection, propensity rule! P is accusing S of another bad act, theft!" Response as 
attorney for P? 
Thus, evidence of the defendant's acts taken towards the plaintiff, 
offered to show the defendant's discriminatory intent or motive, are not 
"other acts." 
D. When Evidence of "Other Acts" Is Offered, What Criteria Must Be Satisfied? 
1. The "Other Acts" Evidence Must Be Relevant to a Contested Issue in 
the Case. 
Rule 404(b),s use of the nonIimiting term, "such as," has been 
construed to mean that evidence of a person's "other" acts, wrongs, or 
crimes may be admitted (subject to the court's exercise of its discretion 
under Rule 403) as long as it is offered as proof of any issue in the case 
other than merely that the individual's conduct in question at trial 
conformed to his or her past character. E.g., United States v. Long, 574 
F.2d 761, 766 (3d Cir. 1978) ("The draftsmen of Rule 404(b) intended it to 
be construed as one of 'inclusion,' and not 'exclusion.' They intended to 
emphasize admissibility of 'other crime' evidence. This emerges from the 
legislative history which saw the 'exclusionary' approach of the Supreme 
Court version of Rule 404(b) notified."). 
See, e.g., United States v. Sovie, 122 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(no abuse of discretion for trial court to permit ex-wives to testify about 
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defendant's abuse of them, to corroborate victim's testimony regarding 
what he had told her, which supported victim's belief that defendant 
intended to harm her); Collins v. Straight, Inc., 748 F.2d 916, 920-21 (4th 
Cir. 1984) (in false imprisonment case, no error to admit evidence of 
defendant's actions towards other patients at drug treatment facility, seen 
by plaintiff. with regard to issue of plaintiff's consent to stay there; also no 
error to admit, on issue of punitive damages, evidence that defendant held 
others against their will). See also Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 
561 n.6 (4th Cir. 1987) (evidence of plaintiff flight attendant's past sexual 
behavior was properly admitted as relevant to her claim that she suffered 
severe emotional distress from co-employee's sexual harassment by foul 
language and other conduct) . 
.Q;i In Hypo #1 (p. 6), suppose that in answer to the D's objection, P's counsel responds that 
the evidence of the other women's complaints of harassment by S is offered to prove 
notice to D-Employer of S's misconduct? 
• See, e.g., Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 81 Empl. Pract. Dec. t}[ 40,779 
at pp. 17,305,17,314-15,2001 u.s. App. LEXIS 18564 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(evidence of supervisor's sexual harassment of others was properly 
admitted as relevant to issue of defendant-employer's deliberate 
indifference to and condonation of his conduct, as well as arguably 
relevant to one or more 404(b) purposes with regard to defendant-
supervisor himself); Deters v. Equifax Credit Information Services, Inc., 
77 Emp!. Prac. Dec. t}[ 46,286 at 99,272 (10th Cir. 2000) (evidence of 
perpetrator's sexual harassment of another female employee than plaintiff 
was properly admitted to show notice to employer). 
2. Standard of Proof: Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 
(1988) held that the proponent of the evidence must present only enough 
evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find. under Rule 104(b), by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the other acts were committed by the 
person in question. The trial judge need not be persuaded of the truth of 
the evidence. (The strength of proof, however, may influence the trial 
court's Rule 403 ruling.) 
3. The Evidence Must Survive Scrutiny under Rule 403: In making a 
determination whether to exclude other acts evidence under Rule 403, a 
judge should consider questions of the following type: 
• How compellina is the proof of the other acts? 
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• If the other events alleeedly happened lone aeo, how probative 
are they? 
• Can the alleged perpetrator be expected to adequately defend 
aeainst them? 
• How lone would hearine the evidence on these matters take? 
• Of how much help will this evidence likely be to the jury in 
properly resolvine the issue before it? 
• See, e.g., Rudin v. Lincoln Land Community College, 420 F.3d 712 
(7th Cir. 2005) (discussing "direct evidence" of discriminatory intent - an 
admission that defendant is acting based on prohibited classification-
and "circumstantial evidence" of discriminatory motivation). 
• Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 126 S.Ct. 1195, 1197 (U.S. 2006) (per 
curiam) (vacating and remanding the 11th Circuit's decision): 
First. there was evidence that Tyson's plant manager, who 
made the disputed hiring decisions, had referred on some occasions to 
each of the petitioners as "boy." Petitioners argued this was evidence 
of discriminatory animus. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that 
"[w]hile the use of 'boy' when modified by a racial classification like 
'black' or 'white' is evidence of discriminatory intent, the use of 'boy' 
alone is not evidence of discrimination." Although it is true the 
disputed word will not always be evidence of racial animus, it does not 
follow that the term, standing alone, is always benign. The speaker's 
meaning may depend on various factors including context, inflection, 
tone of voice, local custom, and historical usage. Insofar as the Court 
of Appeals held that modifiers or qualifications are necessary in all 
instances to render the disputed term probative of bias, the court's 
decision is erroneous. 
4. Limiting Instruction 
If the evidence is admitted, a limiting jury instruction under Rule 
105 should be given on request. United States v. Cooper, 577 F.2d 1079, 
1088-89 (6th Cir. 1978) (in accord with prevailing view, court finds no 
plain error in triaIjudge's failure to sua sponte give limiting instruction 
regarding evidence properly admitted under Rule 404(b)). 
A jury instruction regarding the limited purpose of evidence 
admitted under Rule 404(b) should not be a mere laundry list of categories 
under that rule; it should be focused, so as to help the jury to use the 
evidence only for the proper purpose. See, e.g., United States v. Teague, 
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· , 
737 F.2d 378,381 (4th Cir. 1984) (no error in admission of other crimes 
evidence; inter alia, "immediately after receipt of this testimony before the 
jury, the court gave an excellent charge instructing the jury that it could 
consider such testimony only in trying to determine the defendant's 
motive, intent, knowledge or state of mind and such testimony could not 
be considered in determining whether the defendant committed the act or 
acts charged in the indictment. This is in keeping with this court's 
suggested procedure. This charge was also repeated in the final jury 
instructions.") (citations omitted); United States v. Cortijo-Diaz, 875 F.2d 
13 (1st Cir. 1989). 
Q:h In Fact Pattern #22 on pp. 29-30 of Mr. Fitzgerald's hypothetical, the plaintiff wants to 
offer evidence of "other acts." What is the best argument for admissibility under 404(b)? 
If it is admitted, should the defense be permitted to rebut as suggested? 
E. Rule 415: Special Rule of Admissibility of Other Sexual Assaults by Civil 
Defendant: Notice Required at Least 15 Days Before Trial 
In sexual harassment cases where the alleged misconduct would constitute 
sexual assault, Rule 415 may apply. See EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 
F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2001) (EEOC complied with notice requirement under Rule 
415 in same-sex sexual harassment case). 
Since July 9, 1995, Rules 413-415 have governed the admissibility of 
other crimes evidence in federal sexual assault and child molestation cases. Rule 
413 applies in criminal cases of sexual assault; Rule 414 applies in criminal cases 
of child molestation; Rule 415 applies in civil cases of either type. Adopted in 
response to public perception that recidivist child molesters and rapists are often 
going free because the jury does not hear this evidence, the Rules greatly 
liberalize the admission of evidence of the accused offender's prior sexual 
offenses. 
Rule 415 provides: 
Rule 415. Evidence of Similar Acts in Civil Cases Concerning Sexual 
Assault or Child Molestation 
(a) In a civil case in which a claim for damages or other relief is predicated on a 
party's alleged commission of conduct constituting an offense of sexual assault 
or child molestation. evidence of that party's commission of another offense or 
offenses of sexual assault or child molestation is admissible and may be 
considered as provided in Rule 413 and Rule 414 of these rules. 
(b) A party who intends to offer evidence under this Rule shall disclose the 
evidence to the party against whom it will be offered, including statements of 
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, . 
witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony that is expected to be 
offered. at least fifteen days before the scheduled date of trial or at such later 
time as the court may allow for good cause. 
(c) This rule shall not be construed to limit the admission or consideration of 
evidence under any other rule. 
Rule 413 provides: 
Rule 413. Evidence of Similar Crimes in Sexual Assault Cases 
(a) In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of sexual 
assault, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses 
of sexual assault is admissible. and may be considered for its bearing on any 
matter to which it is relevant. 
* * * 
(d) For purposes of this rule and Rule 415, "offense a/sexual assault" means a 
crime under Federal law or the law of a State (as defined in section 513 of title 
18, United States Code) that involved-
(1) any conduct proscribed by chapter 109A of title 18, United States 
Code; 
(2) contact, without consent, between any part of the defendant's body 
or an object and the genitals or anus of another person; 
(3) contact, without consent, between the genitals or anus of the 
defendant and any part of another person's body; 
(4) deriving sexual pleasure or gratification from the infliction of death, 
bodily injury, or physical pain on another person; or 
(5) an attempt or conspiracy to engage in conduct described in 
paragraphs (1)-(4). 
18 U.S.C. ch. 109A includes §§ 2241 (aggravated sexual abuse), 2242 
(sexual abuse, including causing a person to engage in a sexual act by placing that 
person "in fear"), 2243 (sexual abuse of a minor or ward), 2244 (abusive sexual 
contact rather than sexual "acts," when "acts" would have been covered by §§ 
2241-43, and 2245 (definitions). 
The supporting Congressional analysis explained that such evidence 
could be considered as evidence that the defendant has the motivation or 
disposition to commit sexual assaults, and a lack of effective inhibitions 
against acting on such impulses, and as evidence bearing on the probability 
or improbability that the defendant was falsely implicated in the offense of 
which he or she is presently accused. 
137 Congo Rec. at S3239 (daily ed. Mar. 1991). 
Rule 415 tips toward admissibility, but the evidence may be excluded 
under Rule 403, when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risks 
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of unfair prejudice, confusion or distraction of the jury, or by undue consumption 
of trial time. See United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998). 
• Johnson v. Elk Lake School Dist., 283 F.3d 138, 149-59 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(no abuse of discretion in exclusion of evidence, in sexual harassment suit, 
regarding touching of another female by defendant, when second female's 
testimony was equivocal as to whether touching seemed intentional). 
• Cleveland v. KFC National Management Co., 948 F. Supp. 62,66 (N.D. 
Ga. 1996) (in a Title VII sexual harassment suit against a corporate employer, in 
order for evidence of defendant's agent's prior sexual misconduct to be 
admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 415, the "evidence of defendant's afjent's 
misconduct must be both probative in that it proves corporate knowledfje of 
similar misconduct and it must corroborate plaintiff's story; otherwise, the 
prejudicial effect on the jury is not substantially outweighed") (emphasis in 
original). 
• Frank v. County of Hudson, 924 F. Supp. 620 (D. N.J. 1996). Here the 
magistrate did not abuse his discretion in Irrantinfj a protective order, in this sexual 
harassment action in which sexual assault of adult plaintiffs was alleged, 
protecting the defendant employer from use of his stepdaughter's statement that 
he had sexually abused her for ten years, beginning when she was in the fifth 
grade. The court pointed out, however, that "Plaintiffs are free to question [co-
defendant superiors] ... regarding their knowledge of [defendant's] prior 
actions." The trial judge explained: 
The drafters [ofFRE 4l3-415] justified their sharp departure from the ordinary 
presumption against propensity evidence largely because of the inherent 
difficulties of proving sexual offenses where the trial devolves into a swearing 
contest between defendant and alleged victim because there are no other 
witnesses. FRE 415 was designed in large part to help the victims of sexual 
assault prevail in such swearing contests by allowing them to rebut defendants' 
arguments of consent or lack of intent with evidence that they have been accused 
before. 
Here, by contrast, each plaintiff's claims are supported by the 
allegations of at least the other five. Moreover. since the alleged conduct took 
place in an office setting, it is likely that plaintiffs will be able to locate 
additional witnesses to the alleged conduct. Accordingly, their need for the 
statement of an alleged victim of [defendant's1 sexual offenses at least ten years 
ago is slight compared with the harm that disclosure of the statement would 
certainly work upon [defendant]. 
[d. at 627. 
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~ In Fact Pattern #18 on p. 25 of Mr. Fitzgerald's hypothetical, may the plaintiff introduce 
evidence of the earlier alleged assault? 
F. 	 Rule 412: Special Rule of Inadmissibility of Other Sexual Conduct by 
Plaintiff 
In 1994 Congress amended Rule 412, the "rape shield" law, to extend it to 
civil cases. The Rule applies to protect alleged victims in civil sexual harassment 
cases. 	E.g., Wilson v. City ofDes Moines, 442 F.3d 637, 643 (8th Cir. 2006). 
Rule 412 provides: 
Rnle412. 	 Sex Offense Cases; Relevance of Alleged Victim's Past 
Sexual Behavior or Alleged Sexual Predisposition 
(a) Evidence Generally Inadmissible. The following evidence is not 
admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual 
misconduct except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c): 
(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other 
sexual behavior.7 
(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual 
predisposition. 
(b) Exceptions. 
(1) [criminal cases] 
(2) In a civil case. evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or 
sexual predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is otherwise 
admissible under these rules and its probative value substantially outweighs the 
danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party. Evidence of 
an alleged victim's reputation is admissible only if it has been placed in 
controversy by the alleged victim. 
(c) Procedure to Determine Admissibility. 
(1) A party intending to offer evidence under subdivision (b) must­
(A) file a written motion at least 14 days before trial specifically 
describing the evidence and stating the purpose for which it is offered unless the 
court, for good cause, requires a different time for filing or permits filing during 
trial; and 
7 See Warren v. Prejean, 301 F.3d 893, 906 (8th Cir. 2002) (plaintiff properly permitted to testify about a 
male co-worker's sexual history and preferences in order to rebut defense allegation that she had sexually harassed 
him; court relied on ground that this was not evidence of "other" sexual behavior). 
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(B) serve the motion on all parties and notify the alleged victim or, 
when appropriate, the alleged victim's guardian or representative. 
(2) Before admitting evidence under this rule the court must conduct a 
hearing in camera and afford the victim and parties a right to attend and be 
heard. The motion, related papers, and the record of the hearing must be sealed 
and remain under seal unless the court orders otherwise. 
1. Procedure 
• See Wilson v. City a/Des Moines, 442 F.3d 637,642-44 (8th Cir. 
2006) (failure to file motion or hold a hearing was harmless error under 
circumstances); S.M. v. 1.K., 262 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding 
sanction of exclusion of evidence for failure of defendant to file proffered 
evidence under seal, and holding that plaintiff had not opened door at 
trial); Sheffield v. Hilltop Sand & Gravel Co., 895 F.Supp. 105 (E.D. Va. 
1995) (sanctioning defendant for failing to follow procedural requirement 
of submitting matters under seal by excluding evidence of co-workers' 
testimony regarding plaintiff's sexual conversations at workplace other 
than with alleged harasser). 
2. Manner of Dress, etc. 
The Rule's references to "sexual behavior" and "sexual 
predisposition" are explained as follows in the accompanying Advisory 
Committee note: 
Subdivision (a). As amended, Rule 412 bars evidence offered 
to prove the victim's sexual behavior and alleged sexual predisposition. 
Evidence, which might otherwise be admissible under Rules 402, 
404(b), 405, 607, 608, 609, or some other evidence rule, must be 
excluded if Rule 412 so requires. The word "other" is used to suggest 
some flexibility in admitting evidence "intrinsic" to the alleged sexual 
misconduct. Cf. Committee Note to 1991 amendment to Rule 404(b). 
Past sexual behavior connotes all activities that involve 
actual physical conduct, i.e., sexual intercourse and sexual contact, 
or that imply sexual intercourse or sexual contact. See, e.g., United 
States v. Galloway, 937 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 
S.Ct. 418 (1992) (use of contraceptives inadmissible since use implies 
sexual activity); United States v. One Feather, 702 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 
1983) (birth of an illegitimate child inadmissible); State v. Carmichael, 
727 P.2d 918, 925 (Kan. 1986) (evidence of venereal disease 
inadmissible). In addition, the word "behavior" should be 
construed to include activities of the mind, such as fantasies or 
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dreams.s See C. Wright & K. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 5384 at p. 548 (1980) ("While there may be some doubt 
under statutes that require 'conduct,' it would seem that the language of 
Rule 412 is broad enough to encompass the behavior of the mind."). 
The rule has been amended to also exclude all other evidence 
relating to an alleged victim of sexual misconduct that is offered to 
prove a sexual predisposition. This amendment is designed to exclude 
evidence that does not directly refer to sexual activities or thoughts but 
that the proponent believes may have a sexual connotation for the 
factfinder. Admission of such evidence would contravene Rule 412's 
objectives of shielding the alleged victim from potential embarrassment 
and safeguarding the victim against stereotypical thinking. 
Consequently, unless the (b)(2) exception is satisfied, evidence such 
as that relating to the alleged victim's mode of dress, speech. or life­
style will not be admissible.9 
*** 
The reason for extending Rule 412 to civil cases is equally 
obvious. The need to protect alleged victims against invasions of 
privacy, potential embarrassment, and unwarranted sexual stereotyping, 
and the wish to encourage victims to come forward when they have 
been sexually molested do not disappear because the context has shifted 
from a criminal prosecution to a claim for damages or injunctive relief. 
There is a strong social policy in not only punishing those who engage 
in sexual misconduct, but in also providing relief to the victim. Thus, 
Rule 412 applies in any civil case in which a person claims to be the 
victim of sexual misconduct, sucb as actions for sexual battery or 
sexual harassment. 
*** 
Subdivision (b)(2) governs the admissibility of otherwise 
proscribed evidence in civil cases. It employs a balancing test rather 
than the specific exceptions stated in subdivision (b)(l) in recognition 
of the difficulty of foreseeing future developments in the law. Greater 
flexibility is needed to accommodate evolving causes of action such as 
claims for sexual harassment. 
The balancing test requires the proponent of the evidence, 
whether plaintiff or defendant. to convince the court that the 
probative value of the proffered evidence "substantially outweighs 
8 B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dept., 82 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) en. 40,914,2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 2602 (9th Cir. 
2002) (reversible error to admit evidence of sexual harassment plaintiff's out-of-workplace comments to coworker 
about her sexual fantasies and autoerotic conduct; defendant misrepresented nature of the evidence when responding 
to a Rule 412 objection). 
9 See Jaros v. Lodgenet Entertainment Corp., 294 F.3d 960, 965 (8th Cir. 2002) (evidence of harassment 
plaintiff's "suggestive clothes" was excluded). Rule 412 thus overrules the holding in Mentor Savings Bank v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986), that plaintiff's dress and speech were relevant to whether advances, sex, etc. were 
"unwelcome." 
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the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice of any 
party." This test for admitting evidence offered to prove sexual 
behavior or sexual propensity in civil cases differs in three respects 
from the general rule governing admissibility set forth in Rule 403. 
First, it reverses the usual procedure spelled out in Rule 403 by shifting 
the burden to the proponent to demonstrate admissibility rather than 
making the opponent justify exclusion of the evidence. Second, the 
standard expressed in subdivision (b)(2) is more stringent than in the 
original rule; it raises the threshold for admission by requiring that the 
probative value of the evidence substantially outweigh the specified 
dangers. Finally, the Rule 412 tests puts "harm to the victim" on the 
scale in addition to prejudice to the parties. 
Evidence of reputation may be received in a civil case only if 
the alleged victim has put his or her reputation into controversy. The 
victim may do so without making a specific allegation in a pleading. 
Cf Fed. R. Civ. P. 35(a). 
*** 
The procedures set forth in subdivision (c) do not apply to 
discovery of a victim's past sexual conduct or predisposition in civil 
cases, which will be continued to be governed by Fed. R. Civ. P.26. 
In order not to undermine the rationale of Rule 412, however, 
courts should enter appropriate orders pursuant to Fed. R. eiv. P. 
26(c) to protect the victim against unwarranted inquiries and to 
ensure confidentiality. Courts should presumptively issue protective 
orders barring discovery unless the party seeking discovery makes a 
showing that the evidence sought to be discovered would be relevant 
under the facts and theories of the particular case, and cannot be 
obtained except through discovery. In an action for sexual 
harassment, for instance. while some evidence of the alleged 
victim's sexual behavior and/or predisposition in the workplace 
may perhaps be relevant, non-work place conduct will usually be 
irrelevant.1O Cf Burns v. McGregor Electronic Industries, Inc., 989 
F.2d 959, 962-63 (8th Cir. 1993) (posing for a nude magazine outside 
work hours is irrelevant to issue of unwelcomeness of sexual advances 
at work). Confidentiality orders should be presumptively granted as 
well. 
One substantive change made in subdivision (c) is the 
elimination of the following sentence: "Notwithstanding subdivision 
(b) of Rule 104, if the relevancy of the evidence which the accused 
seeks to offer in the trial depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of 
fact, the court, at the hearing in chambers or at a subsequent hearing in 
chambers scheduled for such purpose, shall accept evidence on the 
issue of whether such condition of fact is fulfilled and shall determine 
such issue." On its face, this language would appear to authorize a trial 
10 E.g., Wolak v. Spucci, 217 F.3d 157, 160-61 (2d Cir. 2000) (harmless error to admit evidence, on issue 
whether plaintiff was injured by display of pornography at work, that she had voluntarily viewed pornography 
outside the workplace). See note 8 supra. 
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judge to exclude evidence of past sexual conduct between an alleged 
victim and an accused or a defendant in a civil case based upon the 
judge's belief that such past acts did not occur. Such an authorization 
raises questions of invasion of the right to a jury trial under the Sixth 
and Seventh Amendments. See 1 S. Saltzburg & M. Martin, Federal 
Rules of Evidence Manual, 396-97 (5th ed. 1990). 
The Advisory Committee concluded that the amended rule 
provided adequate protection for all persons claiming to be the victims 
of sexual misconduct, and that it was inadvisable to continue to include 
a provision in the rule that has been confusing and that raises substantial 
constitutional issues. 
[Advisory Committee Note adopted by Congressional 
Conference Report accompanying Pub.L. 103-322. See. H.R.Conf.Rep. 
No. 103-711, l03rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 383 (1994).] 
3. Rule 412 Tips Against Admissibility, e.g., Socks-Brunot v. Hirschigel, 
Inc., 184 F.R.D. 113 (S.D. Ohio 1999), But Evidence of Plaintiff's 
Behavior at the Defendant's Workplace is Likely to Come In 
• E.g., Wilson v. City of Des Moines, 492 F.3d 637,643-47 (8th Cir. 
2006) (district court's admission of plaintiff's workplace behavior and her 
statements made there while she worked with alleged harassers was 
proper); Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Miranda-Velez, 132 F.3d 848, 855-56 
(1st Cir. 1998) (Rule 412 "was designed to prevent misuse of a 
complainant's sexual history in cases involving 'alleged sexual 
misconduct.' . .. Rule 412 ... reverses the usual approach of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence on admissibility by requiring that the evidence's 
probative value 'substantially outweigh' its prejudicial effect." Under 
facts of the case, district court did not abuse its discretion in excludin~ 
evidence of plaintiff's alleged promiscuity and the marital status of her 
boyfriend. but admitting evidence that her relationship distracted her from 
work and, on issue whether advances were unwelcome, evidence that she 
flirted with alle~edly harassing customer). 
• Saffa v. Oklahoma Oncology, Inc., 405 F.Supp.2d 1280, 1285-86, 
1290-91 (D. Utah 2005) (pretrial ruling excludin~ evidence of sexual 
harassment plaintiff's consensual sexual relationship with another doctor 
five years earlier, before plaintiff was employed by defendant, when doctor 
was separated from his wife; there was no evidence that alleged harasser 
knew of this relationship, but rulin~ that if plaintiff called the earlier 
doctor to testify. their relationship would be relevant to credibility; 
similarly, or if plaintiff testified at trial that "she never thinks in terms of 
affairs," as she has in deposition testimony, the testimony [will be] 
relevant for impeachment"; further, evidence of plaintiff's conduct, and 
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statements regarding the alleged harasser at the employer's Christmas 
party, will be admissible with regard to whether his remarks had offended 
her and with regard to her claim of emotional distress). 
As to a plaintiff's having previously made similar but false 
allegations, cf. Note, The Girl Who Cried Wolf: Missouri's New Approach 
to Evidence of Prior False Allegations, 70 Mo. L. Rev. 813 (2005) 
(suggesting balancing test that would have been appropriate for the court 
to have adopted in State v. Long, 140 S.W.3d 27 (Mo. 2004) (en banc». 
4. How Does Rule 26 Broad Discovery Work as to Rule 412 Information? 
See Note, Unfolding Discovery Issues that Plague Sexual 
Harassment Cases, 57 Hastings LJ. 991 (2006) (discussing, inter alia, 
Rule 35 court-ordered mental examinations); Herschenroeder v. Johns 
Hopkins Univ. Applied Physics Laboratory, 171 F.RD. 179 (D.Md. 1997) 
(Grimm, J.); Barta v. City & County of Honolulu, 169 F.RD. 132 (D. 
Hawaii 1996) (granting motion for protective order); Priest v. Rotary, 98 
F.RD. 755 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (granting motion for protective order). 
QQ." In Fact Pattern #17 on pp. 23-24 of Mr. Fitzgerald's hypothetical, if the plaintiff's 
conduct was all outside the workplace, the answer may turn on (1) whether the alleged 
harasser knew of these maters and therefore believed his initial advances or comments 
were welcome; or (2) whether the plaintiff opens the door by testifying, for example, that 
she would never have an extramarital affair. See Saffa, p. 18. 
G. Intent or Mens Rea of Alleged Perpetrator 
May the defense circumvent the protections of Rule 412 by offering 
evidence of what the alleged perpetrator had heard about the plaintiff, to show the 
alleged harasser's absence of invidious intent when, say, making a sexually 
explicit remark? 
Compare Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1981) (rape 
defendant could properly offer evidence of all of his knowledge of the victim's 
past sexual behavior, which knowledge he had acquired before the alleged crime, 
including hearsay conversations he had had with other men about the victim and 
about a love letter, that he had read, from the victim to another man, to show not 
the victim's consent but the defendant's state of mind at the time of the alleged 
crime, which was relevant with regard to his intent) with United States v. 
Saunders, 943 F.2d 388,391 & 392 n. 1 (4th Cir. 1991) (Rule 412 plainly 
"manifests the policy that it is unreasonable for a defendant to base his belief of 
consent on the victim's past sexual experiences with third persons .... "). 
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Does the first paragraph of the amending Advisory Committee's note 
quoted above resolve this issue? 
H. When, if Ever, is a Person's "Character" an "Essential Element" of a Claim 
or Defense, Under Rule 405(b)? 
Rule 405(b) provides that reputation testimony, opinion testimony, 
and evidence of specific instances are all admissible to prove a person's 
character or character trait, when that person's character is an "essential 
element of a [criminal] charge, [civil] claim, or defense •••• " N.B. Character 
is not an "essential element" just because only persons "of a certain character" 
might do an act of the kind charged. See Gibson v. Mayor & Council, 355 F.3d 
215,232-33 (3d Cir. 2004). If proof that the party did the alleged act would 
suffice to prove the case, then character is not an essential element. 
Rather, for 405(b) to apply, the substantive law requires that someone's 
character must be proven, as an element of the charge, claim, or defense. In the 
very rare situation that character is such an essential element, the most probative-
and the most time-consuming - method of proof is permitted: proof by specific 
instances. You might wonder why Rule 404 says nothing on this topic and instead 
it is hidden away in 405(b). This is a fair question! The simple answer is that 
Rule 404 does not exclude such "essential element" evidence, because it is not 
offered to prove action in conformity with character, but to prove character itself. 
~ In a negligent hiring or retention case, whose character is an essential element of the 
claim? How so? Consider for example, a civil suit against a nursery school for 
negligently hiring a convicted pedophile, or against a bus company for hiring a driver 
with a bad driving record. 
In negligent hiring or retention cases, the plaintiff must show that the 
employer knew or should have known of the employee's bad character for the 
pertinent trait. In such cases, the plaintiff may prove the employer's character by 
reputation or opinion evidence or by evidence of specific acts by the employee, or 
any combination of the three. 
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Suzy, an investment banker, has sued her former employer, Hi & Lo, LLC, for gender-
based discrimination violating Title VII: disparate treatment by manager Matt, including her 
exclusion from client outings, retaliation for complaining about the discrimination, and wrongful 
terminati on. 
Defendant wants to offer, and plaintiff has moved to preclude, the following evidence: 
1. Suzy has worked for 10 different securities firms in a period of less than 20 years. 
Asserted relevance: on issue of mitigation of damages, her ability to find 
subsequent employment. Ruling? 
2. Suzy's poor performance appraisal by her supervisor at the firm where Suzy 
worked prior to Hi & La. Asserted relevance: 
(a) Suzy's character for poor work, failure to meet deadlines, lack of 
cooperation, and insubordination is an element of the defense and 
therefore provable under Rule 405(b); 
(b) This evidence of Suzy's work habits is admissible as habit evidence under 
Rule 406. Rulings? 
(c) This evidence will be admissible to impeach Suzy if she testifies, in effect, 
that her Hi & Lo supervisor simply had it in for her; or 
(d) If Suzy testifies that she has "never missed a deadline" and "has always 
gotten along well with others." Rulings? 
3. Prior similar complaints by Suzy filed against other employers. Ruling? 
Plaintiff wants to offer, and defendant has moved to preclude, the following evidence: 
1. Manager Matt's acts toward Suzy's co-worker Anna (who, unlike Suzy, is Asian 
American), (1) use of the expression "chicks" and "yellow fever" when referring 
to Asian women; (2) asking whether Anna planned to wear a one-piece or two-
piece bathing suit on vacation; (3) asking whether Anna had any "weekend 
exploits;" (4) stating his belief that extra-marital affairs between consenting adults 
were acceptable; (5) his suggestion that Anna use her feminine charms to improve 
client relationships; and (6) Anna's exit interview at Hi & La, in which Anna 
allegedly described discriminatory comments and conduct by Matt and a co-
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worker. Asserted relevance: Matt's motive, intent, plan, and common scheme, in 
his acts toward Suzy. Defendant is likely to offer evidence that Matt hired and 
promoted four women (all Asian ... ). Ruling? 
2. Manager Matt's discriminatory acts against women at his prior places of 
employment. Ruling? 
3. Manager Matt's arrest for disorderly conduct when out with a client - if 
defendants raise the issue of Suzy's perceived "lack of respect" for Matt. 
Asserted relevance: his motive and intent. Ruling? 
4. Co-workers' organizing client trips to strip clubs. Asserted relevance: organizing 
outings which women would not want to attend. Ruling? 
5. Co-worker Andrew's e-mail stating that Suzy and co-worker Lisa were engaging 
in a "mutual bitch session." Suzy did not allege that Andrew discriminated 
against her, and he had no decision-making authority as to her. 
See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 382 F.Supp.2d 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
Hypo #2 
P v. D-Employer for sexual harassment (including unwanted touching) ofP by S-
Supervisor in violation of Title VII and for negligent retention under state law. 
D offers evidence that P has a reputation for being "loose." Asserted relevance: 
(a) P was not n~ally offended by S's actions. Ruling? 
(b) S had heard of the reputation and therefore believed P "wanted it." 
Ruling? 
(c) D also wants to offer eyewitness testimony that P frequently used explicit 
curse words and told sexual jokes in the workplace. Ruling? 
(d) D further wants to offer testimony that P wore a low-cut tank top to work 
more than once. Ruling? 
IV. Impeachment by Evidence of One's Character as to Truthfulness 
A. Evidence Regarding a Witness's Character for Truthfulness is Admissible to 
Prove Propensity to Lie (or to Tell the Truth): Rule 404(a)(3) 
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Evidence of a witness's prior convictions (Rule 609), prior bad acts 
not having resulted in conviction (Rule 608(b», and opinion or reputation 
evidence regarding that witness's bad character trait for truthfulness and 
veracity (Rule 608(a)(1», are admissible to impeach that witness. The 
evidence is offered to prove that the witness acted "in character" and lied in the 
testimony or statement admitted into evidence at trial (Rule 404(a)(3». This 
principle also applies to impeachment of a hearsay declarant (Rule 806). 
A witness whose credibility has been impeached in such a way as to 
constitute an attack on the witness's character for truthfulness may be 
rehabilitated by reputation or opinion evidence as to the witness's good 
character trait for truthfulness and veracity (Rule 608(a)(2». Again, this 
evidence is offered to show that the witness acted "in character" at trial, by telling 
the truth. 
Therefore, in order simply to "dot all i's and cross all t's," Rule 404(a)(3) 
provides for an exception to the propensity rule that permits such impeachment 
and rehabilitation. 
B. Whom Can One Impeach? 
Rule 607 provides that one can impeach any witness, including one's 
own (and, under Rule 806, any hearsay declarant whose out-of-court 
statement is admitted as substantive evidence). 
For a very helpful opinion on all methods of impeachment, see Behler v. 
Hanlon, 199 F.R.D. 553 (D.Md. 2001) (Grimm, J.). 
C. Impeachment by Prior Convictions: Rule 609 
Rule 609 governs impeachment of a witness by certain of his or her prior 
criminal convictions (not juvenile delinquency adjudications) that have not been 
reversed. 
Rule 609. Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime 
(a) General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the character for 
truthfulness of a witness, 
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been 
convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime 
was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under 
the law under which the witness was convicted, and evidence that an 
accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the 
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court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime 
shall be admitted regardless of the punishment, if it readily can be 
determined that establishing the elements of the crime required proof or 
admission of an act of dishonesty or false statement by the witness. 
(b) Time Limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not 
admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the 
conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that 
conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court determines, in the 
interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by 
specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. 
However, evidence of a conviction more than 10 years old as calculated herein, 
is not admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient 
advance written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse 
party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence. 
(c) Effect of Pardon, Annulment, or Certificate of RehabHitation. 
Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under this rule if (1) the conviction 
has been the subject of a pardon, annulment. certificate of rehabilitation, or other 
equivalent procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person 
convicted, and that person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime that was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the conviction 
has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based 
on a finding of innocence. 
(d) Juvenile Adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is 
generally not admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal 
case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the 
accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility 
of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a 
fair determination of the issue of gUilt or innocence. 
(e) Pendency of Appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does 
not render evidence of a conviction inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of 
an appeal is admissible. 
1. Universe of Impeachable Crimes 
a. First. Determine Whether PRE 609(b) or 609(a) Governs 
If the witness's conviction is recent enough, you will look to Rule 
609(a) to determine admissibility. Rule 609(b) will apply "if a period of 
more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of 
the release from prison, whichever is the later date .... " 
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~ What is the applicable date and which subsection of 609 governs when: 
1. W convicted 8/5/69. 
Released from prison 12124/89. [Answer: 12124/89] 
2. W convicted 816101. 
Released on time served. [Answer: 8/06/01] 
3. W convicted 1113/86. 
Released from prison 7113/01. [Answer: 7/13/01] 
b. If 609(b) Applies 
Prior convictions are the most difficult to get in under 609(b). 
c. If 609(a) Applies, Next Determine Whether 609(a)(2) Applies 
If Rule 609(a) is applicable, look first to see whether 
609(a)(2) applies, which is the easiest route of admissibility. 
609(a)(2) will apply only if the crime involved "dishonesty or 
false statement." These are crimen falsi [crimes of untruth] 
crimes, where the factfinder must have found falsehood in order to 
convict. The court has no discretion to exclude a 609(a)(2) 
conviction. The majority rule under the federal case law is that 
crimes merely of theft, etc., are not crimes of "dishonesty" 
under 609(a)(2). The 2006 amendment adds to 609(a)(2) that it 
embraces crimes that readily can be determined to have been a 
crime of dishonesty, i.e., by reference to the legal definition of the 
crime or a source such as the indictment, a statement of admitted 
facts, or jury instructions. 
d. If 609(a)(2) Does Not Fit, Apply 609(a)(l) 
If 609(a) applies but 609(a)(2) does not fit, go to 
609(a)(1). Here only crimes that meet the federal definition of 
felony, i.e., are "punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 
one year" are eligible. 
• The Rule speaks not of the witness's sentence but of the possible 
maximum sentence. 
• Note that the balancing test with regard to impeaching "a 
witness other than the accused" is merely the 403 test. 
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e. Factors Relevant to the Rule 609 Balancing Tests 
• The nature of the prior crime: its relevance to truthfulness 
under oath. 
• Has the witness been "good" or "bad" since the prior 
conviction? 
• How long ago was the prior conviction? (and how old was the 
witness then?) 
• How similar is the prior to the charged crime? (potential for 
unfairly prejudicial use) 
• How important is the witness's credibility to the case? 
2. Manner of Proof 
An earlier version of Rule 609(a) addressed the manner of proof of 
prior convictions for impeachment. You may ask the witness to admit 
having been so convicted ("Are you the same X who was convicted of Y 
crime in Baltimore City, Maryland, on Z date, when you were over 18 
years of age and represented by counsel?"). 
• You cannot go into the details of the crime. 
• But many courts allow you to prove the sentence received. 
If the witness denies the conviction, you then may offer a certified 
copy of the public record of the conviction into evidence. 
• You are required to have this record before you can ask the 
question. 
D. Rule 608(a): Reputation or Opinion Evidence Regarding the Witness's 
Character for Truthfulness 
Rule 608. Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness 
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of 
a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or 
reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character 
is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been 
attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise. 
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(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of 
a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' character for 
truthfulness, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be 
proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, 
if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inguired into on cross-
examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness 
or untruthfulness or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-
examined has testified. 
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other 
witness, does not operate as a waiver of the accused's or the witness' privilege 
against self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters which relate 
only to character for truthfulness. 
1. Proof May Be by Only Either Reputation Testimony or Opinion 
Testimony 
Once a witness (referred to as "the principal witness"), has 
testified, Rule 608(a) permits counsel to call character witnesses to testify 
as to either: 
(1) The principal witness's bad reputation, in the community 
which they share, for truthfulness (this used to be the only 
permissible method of proof, under the common law); or 
(2) The character witness's bad opinion, based on the character 
witness's sufficient first-hand knowledge, of the principal 
witness's character for truthfulness. 
2. Reputation Testimony 
Elicitation of reputation testimony (from what is called a 
"community mouth" witness) is short and sweet. It will vary slightly 
depending on whether the reputation witness personally knows the 
principal witness or merely knows that witness's reputation: 
Q: Do you know X? (or, Have you heard of X?) 
A: Yes, we go to the same school [or live in the same neighborhood, 
etc.] (or "Not personally, but we go to the same school," etc.). 




Q: What is that reputation? 
A: It is bad. 
3. Opinion Testimony 
Elicitation of opinion testimony is similarly short and sweet. The 
proponent will obtain answers to the following questions: 
Does the character witness (W) know the principal witness (X)? 
How does she know X (they work together, go to the same school, 
church, etc.)? 
Over the period of time W has known X, has W formed an opinion 
as to X's character for truthfulness? 
What is that opinion? Answer: "X is a liar." 
Specific acts that led to W's opinion, e.g., "X regularly steals 
from the vending machine," cannot be brought out on direct. The basis 
for such opinion testimony on direct is simply where and how long W has 
known X, e.g., "We've worked together in a small office for 10 years." 
4. Cross-Examination of Character Witness: Inquiry into Specific 
Instances, Rule 608(b )(2), For a Limited Purpose 
On cross-examination, Rule 608(b )(2) permits a 608(a) character 
witness to be asked about specific instances of the principal witness's 
conduct inconsistent with the accuracy of the unfavorable reputation or 
opinion to which the witness has testified. For example, the cross-
examiner might ask, "Did you know that in X's law school class the 
professor made an arithmetic error in X's favor, and X voluntarily came 
forward to tell the professor, so that the professor could lower X's grade?" 
This inquiry is permitted only for the limited purpose of 
impeaching the character witness's testimony. The Questioner may not 
provide extrinsic evidence of this specific instance, and a limiting 
instruction may be given, on request. 
Counsel may not ask a character witness a "guilt-assuming" 
hypothetical. regarding the alleged facts in the case at bar. 
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E. Prior Bad Acts Not Having Resulted in Conviction: Rule 608(b) 
Rule 608(b) permits the court in its discretion to permit witnesses to be 
asked about their own prior acts. probative of untruthfulness. that did not result in 
a conviction. Michael Jackson's accuser's mother, for example, was impeached 
by her earlier welfare fraud and her having fabricated evidence to win a settlement 
in an unrelated case. (Counsel must have a reasonable factual basis for the 
inquiry!) 
If the witness denies these bad acts, counsel may try to refresh the 
witness's memory, but, having failed that, may not prove the acts by extrinsic 
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V. Hearsay Issues 
A. Is the Proffered Evidence Hearsay? 
Rule 801. Definitions 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) 
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement. 
(e) Hearsay. "Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted. 
*** 
1. Hearsay = an out-of-court statement (by the "hearsay declarant") + 
offered today at trial to prove that what the declarant said at another 
time was factually accurate. oes + TOMA = HS 
2. "Out-of-court" thus means that the evidence offered today at trial is of 
a statement made by any person somewhere else at another time. The 
other place may even have been another court proceeding. It is still "out-
of-court" EVEN IF THE DECLARANT IS AT TRIAL TESTIFYING 
TO HIS OR HER OWN EARLIER STATEMENT. 
3. If the evidence offered includes an "oes" of a person, it is hearsay only if 
it is offered at trial to prove "TOMA." TOMA = the truth of the matter 
that was being asserted by the declarant before trial, at the time the 
declarant made the out-of-court statement. 
4. "Statement" may include an implied assertion from an utterance in 
words (if the utterance appears to have been intended by the 
declarant as an assertion of that fact at the time the declarant made 
the utterances). 
5. Steps in Analysis: 
• Who was each out-of-court declarant? 
• What was each declarant asserting at the time s/he made the OeS? 
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• 	 For what purpose, to help to prove what relevant fact, is the 
proponent offering the evidence at trial? 
• 	 It's TOMA only if the proponent is asking the jury to rely on 
what the declarant said in his/her oes as true, accurate, 
correct. 
• 	 Evidence of an OCS is hearsay if it will help to prove what it is 
offered to prove, only if our thought process to make the oes 
relevant must be "Declarant wouldn't have said this, unless it 
was true." 
6. 	 On the other hand, if it is relevant simply that the oes was made, 
regardless whether the oes was true, it is nonhearsay.11 In this event, 
the person testifying to the OCS can be fully cross-examined as to whether 
the OCS was made as slbe has testified. 
7. 	 Another way of looking at this process is as a bus ride: 
lIetrobul 
Doesn't matter whether Decl. 
believed what s/he said or not. 
Get off at 
BUS STOP #1: Nonhearsay 
(Verbal act or legally operative 
fact; statement offered to prove 
effect on its hearer or reader; or 
statement offered as 
circumstantial evidence of 
declarant's being alive, 
consciousness, ability to speak, 
etc.) 
1I.'fObul 
EVI. will help to prove fact it's 
offered to prove, as long as 
Decl. believed what s/he said, 
even if Decl. was factually 
wrong. 
Get off at 
BUS STOP #2: Nonhearsay 
(Statement offered as 
circumstantial ­ not direct ­
evidence of declarant's 
emotion, state of mind, 
knowledge. belief, intent, 
sanity, or insanity.) 
lIetrobul 
Decl.' s belief alone is 
insufficient: we need for Decl. 
to have been both sincere and 
factually correct, in order for 
fact-finder to rely on the Evi. CD 
to help to prove that the Mat. 
Fact®. 
TERMINUS: Hearsay 
II E.g., Wilson v. City ofDes Moines, 442 F.3d 637,641 (8th Cir. 2006) (co-worker's references to 
plaintiff as a "bitch," etc., were not offered for their truth); Mack v. ST Mobile Aerospace Engineering, Inc., 195 
Fed. Appx. 829,842 (lith Cir. 2006) (plaintiff's testimony that supervisor did not tell him he was required to see 
someone else about harassment policy was not hearsay, as he did not testify to a statement). 
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S. If a hearsay objection is made, and the evidence appears to contain an OCS 
of a person, the burden falls .to the proponent of the evidence to explain to 
the court how the evidence either (1) is nonhearsay or (2) falls within a 
hearsay exception. 
Q2.,. Constructive discharge case: plaintiff offers her statements, "You all are so vicious to 
me. Working here is like working in hell!" and "I can't stand it around here!" See, e.g., 
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004). 
B. If It is Hearsay, Does It Fall Within an Exception (Rules SOled), S03, S04, and 
S07) to the Hearsay Rule? 
1. Rule SOl(d)(2): "Nonhearsay": Admission of a Party Opponent 
(d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. A statement is not hearsay 
if-
*** 
(2) Admission by Party-Opponent. The statement is offered against a 
party and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a 
representative capacity or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an 
adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the 
party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the 
party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope ofthe agency or 
employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by 
a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
The contents of the statement shall be considered but are not alone sufficient to 
establish the declarant's authority under subdivision (C), the agency or 
employment relationship and scope thereof under subdivision (D), or the 
existence of the conspiracy and the participation therein of the declarant and the 
party against whom the statement is offered under subdivision (E). 
2. Determinations by EEOC: Admissibility Under Rule 803(8)(C)? 
Rule 803. Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the 
declarant is available as a witness: 
* * * 
(8) Public Records and Reports. Records, reports, statements, or 
data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the 
activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty 
imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, 
however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law 
enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the 
Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation 
made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or 
other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
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Reports appearing to be unreliable may be excluded under the final 
clause at the end of Rule 803(8)(C) if the opponent shows that they are 
unreliable, e.g., Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290 (3d Cir. 1994), or, in the 
court's discretion, under Fed. R. Evid. 403. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. 
Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 167 (1988). As set out in the Advisory Committee 
Note, factors to be considered by the courts under Rule 104(a) that are 
relevant to trustworthiness include the timeliness of the investigation; the 
degree of skill of the official; whether a hearing was held and, if so, at 
what level; and possible motivation problems of the out-of-court 
declarants. 
The investigator's factually based opinions and evaluations may be 
admitted as factual findings, if they are not shown to lack trustworthiness. 
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153 (1988). Compare, e.g., 
Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264,272 (5th Cir. 1980) (harmless error to 
exclude EEOC investigative reports and determinations) with Anderson v. 
Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 406 F.3d 248,263-64 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(no abuse of discretion in excluding Department of Energy's draft 
assessment of employer's EEO program); Young v. James Green 
Management, Inc., 327 F.3d 616,623-25 (7th CiT. 2003) (no abuse of 
discretion in excluding EEOC determination of discrimination, when court 
found EEOC's determinations unreliable, and evidence on which they 
were based was repeated at trial); Denny v. Hutchinson Sales Corp., 649 
F.2d 816, 820-22 (10th Cir. 1981) (no error to exclude Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission's finding of probable cause, which was made without 
a hearing); Angelo v. Bacharach Instrument Co., 555 F.2d 1164, 1176 (3d 
Cir. 1977) (no abuse of discretion in excluding "determination" letter 
issued by EEOC that there was reasonable cause to believe that defendant 
had violated Equal Pay Act). See also Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 
840,863 n.39 (1976) ("Prior administrative findings made with respect to 
an employment discrimination claim may, of course, be admitted as 
evidence at a federal-sector trial de novo."); Lovejoy-Wilson v. Naco 
Motor Fuels, Inc., 242 F.Supp.2d 236,242-43 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (reserving 
ruling on whether EEOC determination of violation would be admissible). 
The term "factual findings" in subsection (C) has been 
interpreted not to embrace hearsay that was the basis for such 
findings. E.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mmahat, 907 F.2d 546,551 
n.6 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Though factual findings are admitted by Fed. R. 
Evid. 803(8)(C), hearsay statements contained in the report are not."). To 
admit such other hearsay, another hearsay exception or a nonhearsay 
purpose must be cited. Rule 805. 
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Queries: 
• If the EEOC report quotes a supervisor's letter of resignation 
protesting discriminatory practices, may the plaintiff prove that quotation, 
as substantive evidence? See Young, 327 F.3d at 622-23 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(Rule 801(d)(2)(D) not applicable to statements made by defendant's 
employee in letter of resignation). 
• Are EEOC personnel experts, so that hearsay that they "reasonably 
relied on" may be admitted, in their reports, for a limited purpose under 
Rule 703? See Coleman v. Home Depot, Inc., 306 F.3d 1333, 1345 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (EEOC reports are not "expert opinion evidence"; no abuse of 
discretion in excluding report). 
• If the hearsay is substantively inadmissible and self-serving, is it a 
reasonable basis for the EEOC determination? 
• How should juries be instructed about what weight to give to 
EEOC determinations? 
C. Double/Multiple Hearsay 
If the statement offered is that of one out-of-court declarant who was 
repeating another out-of-court statement, a hearsay exception (or nonhearsay 
category) must be shown to apply for each statement in order to admit both. Rule 
805. 
VI. Privileges 
• E.g., Nyack v. Southern Connecticut State Univ., 424 F.Supp.2d 370, 
374-76 (D. Conn. 2006) (three proffered "double hearsay" statements were 
admissible against defendant as statements by its agent, under Rule 
801(d)(2)(D), because both declarants exercised supervisory authority over 
the plaintiff; a fourth was excluded, because the employee who repeated 
the supervisor's statement was "outside the personnel decisionmaking 
hierarchy governing [plaintiff's] conduct"). 
A. Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege 
1. Federal common law privilege of Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), 
extended to unlicensed social workers providing counselling in Employee 
Assistance Programs. Olesko v. State Compensation Insurance Fund, 243 
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F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming denial of plaintiff's discovery 
request). 
2. Waiver by Putting Mental Condition in Issue. Most lower courts hold that 
a plaintiff who alleges that illegal discrimination against her resulted in 
extreme emotional distress waives her psychotherapist-patient privilege. 
E.g., Schoffstall v. Henderson, 223 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding no 
abuse of discretion in dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff's claims 
alleging emotional distress due to plaintiff's willful noncompliance with 
discovery order). 
B. No Medical Peer Review Committee Privilege at Federal Common Law 
Vinnani v. Novant Health, Inc., 259 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2001) (Indian doctor 
alleging that peer review committee committed national origin discrimination 
violative of 42 U.S.c. §§ 1981 and 1985 could obtain discovery of peer reviews 
of other ob-gyn's during pertinent time period). 
Note that Congress has created such a privilege for reviews by or for the 
Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs. IOU. S. C. § 
1102(a); 38 U.S.C. § 5705(a). 
C. No Academic Peer Review Privilege at Federal Law 
University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1998) (plaintiff had been 
denied tenure). Absent a privilege, however, the district courts must fashion 
appropriate safeguards regarding confidential files, in light of "the parties' 
competing needs." Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 
F.2d 1150 (7th Cir.1984) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 470 U.S. 373 (1985). 
D. Effect in Federal Court of Privileges Recognized Only by State Law? 
1. Federal question cases: only federal law of privilege applies 
2. Diversity cases: state law, Fed. R. Evid. 501 
3. Federal question cases with pendent state law claims: 
Only the federal law of privilege applies to the federal question - or does 
it? See, e.g., Vinnani v. Novant Health, Inc., 259 F.3d 284,287 n.3 (4th 
Cir. 2001) (declining to recognize a federal medical peer review privilege 
like that applicable under North Carolina law). 
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E. Waiver by Inadvertent Disclosure When Ordered to Produce Electronically-Stored 
Information, E-Mail, Etc., Pre-Privilege Review? 
See Hopson v. Mayor & City Council, 232 F.R.D. 228 (D. Md. 2005); 
Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 502. See generally Kenneth S. Broun & Daniel J. Capra, 
Getting Control of Waiver of Privilege in the Federal Courts: A Proposal for a 
Federal Rule of Evidence 502,58 S.C. L. REv. 211 (2006); Douglas R. Richmond, 
The Attorney-Client Privilege and Associated Confidentiality Concerns in the 
Post-En ron Era, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 381 (2005). 
F. When Does Use of Company Computer Not Waive Employee's Privilege? 
See Curto v. Med. World Commc'n, Inc., 99 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 298, 
2006 WL 131 8367,2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29387 (E.D.N.Y. May 15,2006) (use 
of a company laptop at home, to access employee's personal AOL account, but 
she then deleted personal e-mail- including e-mails to her attorney - before 
returning laptop to work; her attorney-client privilege held not waived). 
VII. Spoliation of Evidence: Adverse Inference -- Employer Obligation to Preserve 
Possible E-Mail Evidence When Facing Litigation 
See new Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(0 (became effective December 1, 2006) precluding 
adverse inference when loss of evidence was "a result of the routine, good-faith operation 
of an electronic information system." 
• Thompson v. HUD, 219 F.R.D. 93 (D. Md. 2003) (imposing sanctions but not 
adverse inference instruction). 
• Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), subsequent 
proceeding, 382 F.Supp.2d 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Defendant's personnel deleted e-mails 
after a gender discrimination lawsuit had been filed, "even though they had received at 
least two directions from counsel not to." The court imposed an adverse inference 
instruction, awarded reimbursement of costs of redeposing individuals, and awarded 
attorneys' fees for a sanctions motion. Counsel has a duty "to effectively communicate" 
discovery obligations to their client, and "once the duty to preserve attaches, counsel must 
identify sources of discoverable information." Counsel "must put in place a litigation 
hold, and make that known to all relevant employees by communicating with them 
directly." This includes stopping any routine e-mail deletion, as well as routine 
destruction of "back up tapes." 
• Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., 223 F.R.D. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
Party facing litigation must take active steps to halt automatic e-mail deletion process. 
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